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NOTE
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-Balancing First Amendment
Rights to Freedom of Expression Against the Rights of an
Individual to Privacy in the Home. Schultz v. Frisby, 807
F.2d 1339 (7th Cir. 1986).
The first amendment of the United States Constitution
provides that "Congress shall make no law ... abridging the
freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people
peaceably to assemble.... ." In Schultz v. Frisby,2 the United
States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit held that a
town ordinance 3 prohibiting all picketing in residential areas4
was an overly-broad restriction 5 on protected speech6 in a
public forum 7 and therefore violated the rights guaranteed by
the first amendment.8
The court of appeals, in a two-to-one decision, 9 held that
peaceful picketing in residential streets qualified as protected
speech in a public forum under the first amendment, and that
the ordinance under scrutiny"° failed to allow picketers access
to adequate alternative outlets in which to express them-
selves."I The court acknowledged that the government had a
significant interest in protecting the privacy of its citizens in
1. The first amendment provides in full: "Congress shall make no law respecting an
establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the free-
dom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to
petition the Government for a redress of grievances." U.S. CONST. amend. I.
The first amendment was extended to the states in Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S.
652 (1925), through the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. City ordi-
nances also are covered by the first amendment. Lovell v. City of Griffin, 303 U.S. 444
(1938).
2. 807 F.2d 1339 (7th Cir. 1986).
3. TOWN OF BROOKFIELD, Wis., GEN. CODE § 9.17 (1985).
4. Schultz, 807 F.2d at 1342.
5. Id. at 1350.
6. Id. at 1343-44.
7. Id. at 1347.
8. Id. at 1355.
9. Senior Circuit Judge Swygert delivered the majority opinion and was joined by
Circuit Judge Wood. Circuit Judge Coffey filed a dissenting opinion. Id.
10. TOWN OF BROOKFIELD, Wis., GEN. CODE § 9.17 (1985).
11. Schultz, 807 F.2d at 1348.
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their homes, 12 but it affirmed the district court's 13 granting of
a preliminary injunction against enforcing the ordinance be-
cause it did not address precisely the privacy concern that mo-
tivated its passage.' 4
This Note begins with a brief synopsis of the facts in
Schultz. A discussion of the pertinent first amendment issues
and tests of constitutionality will follow. An analysis of the
decision of the court of appeals will then be presented, and
this Note will conclude with an assessment of the ruling and
its impact on first amendment law generally.
I. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
On April 20, 1985, the Milwaukee Coalition for Life5
sponsored the first of several protests16 at the residence of
Benjamin Victoria, M.D.,1 7  in the Town of Brookfield,
Wisconsin. i" The group was protesting Dr. Victoria's per-
formance of abortions in his medical practice.' 9 For the most
part, the demonstrations were conducted in a peaceable and
orderly fashion.2 °
12. Id. at 1350.
13. Id. at 1343, aff'g, 619 F. Supp. 792 (E.D. Wis. 1985).
14. Schultz, 807 F.2d at 1355.
15. The named plaintiffs-appellees, Sandra C. Schultz and Robert C. Braun, are
members of the Milwaukee Coalition for Life. Schultz v. Frisby, 807 F.2d 1339 (7th
Cir. 1986).
16. The group picketed the residence in question on at least six occasions between
April 20 and May 20, 1985. The number of picketers varied but was never less than 10
nor more than 50. Id.
17. Neither Dr. Victoria nor any member of his family was a party to this action.
The named defendants-appellants in the case were the Supervisors of the Town Board,
the Chairman of the Town Board, the Chief of Police, the Town Attorney and the
Town of Brookfield. Id. at 1342.
18. The Town of Brookfield is made up primarily of residential subdivisions, with
only one commercial thoroughfare, and it is located near Milwaukee. Id. at 1340.
19. The plaintiffs stated that picketing the Victoria residence, rather than abor-
tion clinics, was necessary in order to inform Victoria's neighbors of his activities. They
also asserted that the picketing of the Victoria home allowed the group to reach an
audience it might not otherwise reach if it protested elsewhere. The group also pointed
out that it did not want to interfere with its sidewalk counselors outside of abortion
clinics. Id. at 1341-42. There is no indication why Dr. Victoria was singled out as the
subject of this expressive activity.
20. Id. at 1341 (quoting Schultz v. Frisby, 619 F. Supp. 792, 795 (E.D. Wis. 1985)).
The parties disagreed upon the nature of the picketers' conduct. The Town submitted
sworn affidavits stating that the picketers had tied red ribbons to the bushes and to the
door of the home. Id. at 1340. Another affidavit stated the picketers were observed
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After the picketing began, the Town of Brookfield enacted
an ordinance stating that "[it is unlawful for any person to
engage in picketing before or about the residence or dwelling
of any individual in the Town of Brookfield. ' ' 21  The Town
asserted that its purposes in passing the ordinance were to
protect the privacy of its residents as well as to prevent the
obstruction of vehicular and pedestrian traffic.2 2 No picketing
occurred after the effective date of the ordinance.23
The picketers filed suit in the District Court of the Eastern
District of Wisconsin, 4 seeking declaratory and injunctive
relief from enforcement of the ordinance. The complaint al-
leged that the breadth of the restriction resulted in a depriva-
tion of the plaintiffs' rights as guaranteed under the first and
fourteenth amendments of the United States Constitution.
Finding them likely to prevail on the merits, 2 6 the district
singing "God Bless America" and carrying signs that read "baby killer." Id. Neigh-
bors complained that the picketers had made statements to their six year old daughter
to the effect that Dr. Victoria killed babies, causing the child to become frightened and
forcing the parents to explain abortion to her. Id. at 1341. The Victorias also com-
plained of abusive language and of picketers blocking their exit from their home. Id.
The plaintiffs, however, submitted affidavits stating that the picketing was entirely
peaceful. They claimed that picketers confined themselves to the streets and avoided
blocking traffic or causing excessive noise. Id.
21. Id. at 1342 (quoting TOWN OF BROOKFIELD, Wis., GEN. CODE § 9.17 (1985)).
Previously, on May 7, 1985, the Town had enacted an ordinance that prohibited picket-
ing before or about the residence or dwelling of any individual, except for picketing
during a labor dispute of the place of employment involved in the labor dispute. Id.
However, the Town Attorney, convinced that the ordinance violated the first amend-
ment rights of picketers under the Supreme Court's ruling in Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S.
455 (1980), instructed the Town Chief of Police to withhold enforcement. The Town
then repealed the old ordinance and substituted the one being challenged in this case.
Schultz, 807 F.2d at 1342.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Schultz v. Frisby, 619 F. Supp. 792 (E.D. Wis. 1985).
25. Id. at 793. An action under the first amendment is coupled with an action
under the fourteenth amendment in order to bring the acts of state and municipal gov-
ernments within the purview of the first amendment. See supra note I.
26. The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals, in ON/TV of Chicago v. Julien, 763
F.2d 839 (7th Cir. 1985), laid out four tests which must be met in order to obtain a
preliminary injunction.
[A] plaintiff must show: (1) that he had no adequate remedy at law or will suffer
irreparable harm if the injunction is denied; (2) that the harm he will suffer is
greater than the harm the defendant will suffer if the injunction is granted:
(3) that the plaintiff has a reasonable likelihood of success on the merits; and
(4) that the injunction will not harm the public interest.
1987]
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court granted the picketers a preliminary injunction. 27 The
district court reasoned that the ordinance was not narrowly
tailored enough to advance the Town's stated interests with-
out unduly infringing upon the picketers' first amendment
rights .2  The defendants appealed.
The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit held that the
streets in question, despite their location in a residential area,
were public forums 29 and that the ordinance therefore unduly
restricted expressive activities in the area.30 The court thus
found that the district court did not abuse its discretion in
granting the preliminary injunction on the grounds that the
ordinance was an unconstitutional restriction of first amend-
ment rights.3'
II. THE FIRST AMENDMENT-BACKGROUND AND ISSUES:
PROTECTED SPEECH, TYPES OF FORUMS AND
TESTS OF CONSTITUTIONALITY
A. Protected Speech
The first amendment prohibits the government from
"abridging the freedom of speech" or "the right of the people
peaceably to assemble. '3 2 However, not all speech is pro-
tected by the first amendment,33 and not all "speech" involves
the spoken word.34 Although the Supreme Court has not de-
fined what constitutes protected speech, it has said that "[a]ll
ideas having even the slightest redeeming social importance
Id. at 842 (citing Palmer v. City of Chicago, 755 F.2d 560, 576 (7th Cir. 1985)). A
decision to grant or to deny a preliminary injunction is within the discretion of the trial
court. See, e.g., Maxim's Ltd. v. Badonsky, 772 F.2d 388, 390 (7th Cir. 1985).
27. The preliminary injunction was to become permanent, absent an appeal or re-
quest for a trial, within sixty days. Schultz, 619 F. Supp. at 798.
28. Id. at 797.
29. Schultz, 807 F.2d at 1347.
30. Id. at 1355.
31. Id. at 1343.
32. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
33. See, e.g., New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964) (libel); Roth v.
United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957) (obscenity).
34. See generally Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense & Educ. Fund, Inc.. 473
U.S. 788 (1985) (solicitation of contributions); United States v. Grace, 461 U.S. 171
(1983) (picketing and leafletting); Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n.
460 U.S. 37 (1983) (use of an interschool mail system); Heffron v. International Soc'y
for Krishna Consciousness, 452 U.S. 640 (1981) (handing out of leaflets); Tinker v. Des
Moines Indep. Community School Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969) (wearing of armbands).
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- unorthodox ideas, controversial ideas, even ideas hateful
to the prevailing climate of opinion - have the full protection
of first amendment guarantees, unless excludable because
they encroach upon the limited area of more important
interests. '35
The Supreme Court has acknowledged that picketing is
actually a mixture of "speech" and "conduct."36 In addition,
the Court has consistently held that "[t]here is no doubt that
as a general matter peaceful picketing and leafletting are ex-
pressive activities involving 'speech' protected by the [f]irst
[a]mendment. ' '37
B. Types of Forums
The fact that an expressive activity is protected under the
first amendment does not give one the right to engage in that
activity at any time and in any place.38 Such activity is subject
to reasonable regulation in the interest of society.39
The amount of permissible governmental regulation on
expressive activity will depend upon the type of area, or "fo-
rum," in which the activity takes place.4° The Supreme Court
has recognized three types of forums which are differentiated
according to the access afforded them for expressive activity.4 t
Those forums are the traditional public forum, the designated
public forum and the nonpublic forum.4'
The traditional public forum, known for allowing the most
freedom of expression,43 historically has been defined in terms
of its geographic qualities.' Describing this forum, the
35. Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484 (1957).
36. See Shuttlesworth v. City of Birmingham, 394 U.S. 147, 152 (1969). Whether
conduct may be considered within the area of protected expressive activity depends on
whether "in the surrounding circumstances the likelihood was great that the message
would be understood by those who viewed it." Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405.
411 (1974).
37. Grace, 461 U.S. at 176.
38. See Heffron, 452 U.S. at 647.
39. See Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence. 468 U.S. 288. 293 (1984).
40. Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983).
41. Id. at 45-46. See also Heffron, 452 U.S. at 650-51; Grace, 461 U.S. at 177-80.
42. Perry, 460 U.S. at 45-46.
43. Id. at 45.
44. See id. See also Hague v. Committee for Indus. Org., 307 U.S. 496, 515 (1939).
The lower federal courts, however, have expanded the definition of the traditional
public forum due to the creation of new areas particularly suitable for expressive activ-
1987]
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Supreme Court has stated that "[i]n places which by long tra-
dition or by government fiat have been devoted to assembly
and debate, the rights of the State to limit expressive activity
are sharply circumscribed."4 5 The Court has said that streets
and parks, having always been available for the purposes of
communication of thoughts and discussion of public ques-
tions, are public forums.46
The second type of forum the Court recognizes is the des-
ignated public forum.47  This includes government-owned
property that is not traditionally open for free expression but
which the state has made available to the public for use as a
place for expressive activity.48 Once the government opens an
area as a designated public forum, that area takes on the same
qualities as the traditional public forum,49 but the state is not
required to keep a designated public forum open indefinitely
and can close it again under some circumstances.5 0
The nonpublic forum is the third type of forum that the
Court recognizes.5 A nonpublic forum is "[p]ublic property
which is not by tradition or designation a forum for public
communication."52 The government may impose greater re-
ity. The courts now look for areas that resemble the geographically determined tradi-
tional public forums in their openness and accessability-their "street-like character,"
as one court put it. Fernandes v. Limmer, 663 F.2d 619, 627 (5th Cir. 1981). The
seventh circuit has joined this trend by applying this concept to airport terminals. See
Chicago Area Military Project v. City of Chicago, 508 F.2d 921 (7th Cir. 1975).
The trend toward an access-oriented definition of the traditional public forum, how-
ever, has been confined to the lower courts. The Supreme Court declined to address the
topic, although it granted certiorari on a case presenting the issue, in Board of Airport
Comm'rs v. Jews for Jesus, Inc., 107 S. Ct. 2568 (1987). The access-oriented definition
of the public forum is inapplicable in Schultz because the forum was determined by its
geographic qualities.
45. Perry, 460 U.S. at 45.
46. Hague, 307 U.S. at 515.
47. Perry, 460 U.S. at 45-46.
48. Id. See generally Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263 (1981) (state university
holding its meeting facilities open to registered student groups); City of Madison Joint
School Dist. No. 8 v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Comm'n, 429 U.S. 167 (1976)
(school board opening its meetings to direct citizen involvement); Southeastern Promo-
tions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546 (1975) (city's municipal theater dedicated to expres-
sive activities).
49. Perry, 460 U.S. at 46.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Id.
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strictions on expressive activities in these areas.53 In deciding
whether an area is a nonpublic forum or some other type of
forum, the courts consider whether the dedicated purpose of
the area will be disturbed by opening it up to expressive activ-
ity;5 4 if permitting expressive activity will disrupt the dedi-
cated purpose of the forum, then the area stands a good
chance of being classified as a nonpublic forum.
C Tests of Constitutionality
The type of forum will dictate the standards by which any
government restrictions on expressive activity will be tested in
order to determine their constitutionality.5 5 If a court decides
an area is either a traditional or a designated public forum -
both of which are governed by the same standards as long as
the government allows the designated public forum to remain
open - the government is given the right to impose upon
speech in those forums certain content-based restrictions 6
and certain regulations of time, place and manner.5 7  In a
traditional or designated public forum, the government may
enforce restrictions on the time, place and manner of the ex-
pressive activity which (1) are content-neutral, 58 (2) are nar-
53. Id. See generally Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense & Educ. Fund, Inc., 473
U.S. 788 (1985) (government employee fund raising drive); Perry, 460 U.S. 37 (inter-
school mail system); Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828 (1976) (military base); Adderley v.
Florida, 385 U.S. 39 (1966) (jailhouse grounds).
54. See, e.g., Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 804.
55. Perry, 460 U.S. at 45-46.
56. Id. The Supreme Court has said that "Ifor the State to enforce a content-based
exclusion it must show that its regulation is necessary to serve a compelling state inter-
est and that it is narrowly drawn to achieve that end." Id. (citing Carey v. Brown, 447
U.S. 455, 461 (1980)).
However, in Grace, the Court held a complete ban on certain types of expressive
conduct, as is the case with the Town of Brookfield ordinance in question, to be facially
content neutral. 461 U.S. 171, 181 n.10. Thus, this examination will concentrate on the
time, place and manner restrictions.
57. Perry, 460 U.S. at 45-46.
58. Id. at 45. As previously mentioned, the Court has held absolute prohibitions
on certain types of expression, namely picketing and leafletting, to be facially content
neutral. See supra note 56.
In Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 461 (1980), the Court held that an ordinance which
prohibited all picketing except "peaceful picketing of a place of employment involved in
a labor dispute" discriminated between lawful and unlawful conduct based upon the
content of the demonstrators' communication. Id. at 460. "On its face, the Act accords
preferential treatment to the expression of views on one particular subject .... The
permissibility of residential picketing under the ... statute is thus dependent solely on
1987]
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rowly tailored 9 (3) to serve a significant public interest,60 and
(4) leave open ample alternative channels of communication. 61
the nature of the message being conveyed." Id. at 460-61. Such a distinction was found
to be content-based and led to the Carey ordinance being held unconstitutional.
59. Perry, 460 U.S. at 45. The federal courts are split on the standard to be applied
in determining whether a restriction is narrowly tailored. Some courts hold that a re-
striction on expressive activity, to qualify as narrowly tailored, must be the least restric-
tive means available to protect the government interest involved. See Cox v. Louisiana,
379 U.S. 559, 562 (1965); City of Watseka v. Illinois Pub. Action Council, 796 F.2d
1547, 1554 (7th Cir. 1986), aff'd, 107 S. Ct. 919, 920 (1987); Association of Community
Orgs. for Reform v. City of Frontenac, 714 F.2d 813, 818 (8th Cir. 1983); Chicago Area
Military Project v. City of Chicago, 508 F.2d 921, 926 (7th Cir. 1975). Thus, in order
to have the restriction upheld as constitutional under this test, the government bears the
burden of showing that its purported interests could not be protected by a less restric-
tive ordinance.
Other courts, however, merely require that the restriction, in order to withstand
constitutional scrutiny, must be narrowly tailored enough so that it does not unduly
infringe upon constitutional rights. See Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Vio-
lence, 468 U.S. 288, 299 (1984).
Subsequent to the disposition of Schultz by the court of appeals, the Supreme Court
appeared to settle this dispute by affirming without opinion a case appealed to the Court
which applied the requirement that the ordinance be the least restrictive means avail-
able. City of Watseka, 107 S. Ct.. 919 (1987), aff'g, 796 F.2d 1554 (7th Cir. 1986).
However, the dissent, in which three justices took part, showed a possible basis for
future decisions by stating "[we] have not imposed the requirement that the restriction
be the least restrictive means available." City of Watseka, 107 S. Ct. at 920, (White, J.,
dissenting).
60. Perry, 460 U.S. at 45. The significant governmental interest can vary greatly,
depending upon the area in which the expressive activity takes place. See generally
Heffron v. International Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, 452 U.S. 640, 652 (1981)
(traffic flow on the state fair grounds); Carey, 447 U.S. at 464 (privacy in the home);
Association of Community Orgs. for Reform Now, 798 F.2d 1260, 1268-69 (9th Cir.
1986) (flow of vehicular traffic in city streets as well as safety of pedestrians and dis-
tracted motorists); Chicago Area Military Project, 508 F.2d at 924 (interference with
airport activities as well as littering).
One of the more interesting "governmental interests" the Supreme Court has had to
analyze arose in United States v. Grace, 461 U.S. 171 (1983). In Grace, the Court had
to determine whether a restriction banning picketing in its own Supreme Court building
and on its adjoining grounds protected a significant interest. The government's pur-
ported interests included maintaining the appearance of objectivity of the Court "as
well as the maintenance of proper order and decorum." Id. at 182-83. The Court found
that the government's justification for the ban on picketing was "insufficient" to uphold
the prohibition. Id. at 183.
61. Perry, 460 U.S. at 45. "[A] restriction on expressive activity may be invalid if
the remaining modes of communication are inadequate." Members of the City Council
of Los Angeles v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 812 (1984).
The fact that a restriction prohibits only some, and not all, expressive activity has
been considered by the Court in determining if adequate alternative channels remain.
See, e.g., Grace, 461 U.S. at 181 n.10. Accordingly, this implies that a prohibition
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If a nonpublic forum is at issue, the State is given greater
latitude to regulate speech in the area; the State has the right
to place restrictions on expressive activity as long as they are
"reasonable"6 and are viewpoint neutral.63
III. THE SCHULTZ OPINIONS
A. The Swygert Majority
Senior Circuit Judge Swygert, writing for the majority in
Schultz v. Frisby,64 acknowledged that the picketing in ques-
tion, because it involved conduct as an element of its expres-
sive activity,65 was not an instance of "pure speech." 66
However, he pointed out that the Supreme Court has given
peaceful picketing first amendment protection in the past.67
which bans all expressive activity would necessarily fail to provide adequate alternative
channels.
Circuit Judge Swygert points out the possibility that the adequacy of the alternative
will hinge not on the number of alternatives available but on the quality of those alter-
natives. He cites Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. at 812, in support of this proposition.
This approach, however, has never been expressly considered by the Supreme Court and
appears to have been brought to Judge Swygert's attention by the trial court in Schultz,
619 F. Supp. 792, 797 (E.D. Wis. 1985).
62. Perry, 460 U.S. at 46. "The reasonableness of the government's restriction of
access to a nonpublic forum must be assessed in the light of the purpose of the forum
and all the surrounding circumstances." Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense & Educ.
Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 809 (1985).
Under most circumstances, the government's goal of preserving the property for
its dedicated purpose is seen as reasonable, and the presence of alternative channels of
communication will support the reasonableness of the restriction. See, e.g., Perry, 460
U.S. at 50-53.
Some proponents of first amendment rights, however, have advocated a stricter test
which would require that a restriction be struck down unless freedom of expression was
incompatible with the dedicated purpose of the area. Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 819-21
(Blackmun, J., dissenting).
63. Perry, 460 U.S. at 46. "Implicit in the concept of the nonpublic forum is the
right to make distinctions in access on the basis of subject matter and speaker identity."
Id. at 49. Although the State may make these distinctions in a nonpublic forum, it is
not allowed to impose a restriction which is "an effort to suppress expression merely
because public officials oppose the speaker's view." Id. at 46 (citing United States Pos-
tal Serv. v. Council of Greenburgh Civic Ass'n, 453 U.S. 114, 131 n.7 (1981)). There-
fore, once the government allows a particular topic to be discussed in the nonpublic
forum, it will not be justified in restricting discussion of one particular ideology on that
subject.
64. 807 F.2d 1339 (7th Cir. 1986).
65. Id. at 1343.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 1343-44 (citing United States v. Grace, 461 U.S. 171, 176 (1983)). See
supra note 37 and accompanying text.
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Thus, the majority held that the activity in question consti-
tuted protected speech.68
The majority decision went on to hold that the street on
which the picketing occurred was a public forum, despite its
location in a residential neighborhood.69 Having established
this, the court proceeded to analyze the ordinance according
to the tests applicable to a regulation of protected speech in a
public forum. 0
The court first determined that the ordinance did not leave
open ample alternative channels of communication for the
picketers.7' In so holding, the court found that the restriction
of picketing to nonresidential areas significantly affected the
quality and character of the picketers' message,72 thereby
making ineffective any alternatives that were available.7 3
The majority next turned its attention to whether the ordi-
nance was narrowly tailored 4 to protect a significant govern-
ment interest.75 In deciding that the ordinance was not
68. Schultz, 807 F.2d at 1344.
69. Id. at 1347. For a discussion of the Court's analysis, see id. at 1345-47, in
which the majority decided that streets are generally public forums. The Court read-
dressed the issue from the standpoint of whether the residential situs affects a street's
status as a public forum. See id. at 1351.
70. See id. at 1347-55. See also supra notes 56-61 and accompanying text.
71. Schultz, 807 F.2d at 1348.
72. Id. at 1348. The Court stated that to limit the picketers' activities to nonresi-
dential areas would be "in effect, to force them to engage in an entirely different form of
expressive activity." Id.
73. Id. Since the Town of Brookfield had only one commercial thoroughfare, the
restriction of picketers to nonresidential areas would have protected all but one street of
the town from that form of expressive activity. Id. at 1340.
74. The court cited the following as its standard: "The requirement that a legisla-
tive enactment affecting expressive activity be narrowly tailored means simply that the
questioned regulation 'may extend only as far as the interest it serves.' " Id. at 1349
(quoting Central Hudson Gas & Elec. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 565
(1980)).
75. It is interesting to note the court's analysis at this point. The elements of being
narrowly tailored and protecting a significant governmental interest, although constitut-
ing two separate prongs of a test, necessarily are intertwined. In order to know whether
a restriction is narrowly tailored to protect a governmental interest, one must first know
what interest is being protected, since different interests require different levels of pro-
tection. However, the Schultz court first addresses the issue of being narrowly tailored
before determining exactly what interest the restriction protects. Presumably, this or-
der of analysis occurs because of the order in which the tests are normally stated. But
common sense and sound reasoning dictate that the order in which the court addressed
the two issues should have been reversed.
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narrowly tailored,76 the court retained the requirement it had
used in earlier decisions77 that the government must show that
its objectives will not be served by any less restrictive means.78
Because the ordinance brought within its scope several poten-
tially non-disruptive activities, 79 the court found that it was
not narrowly tailored.
Finally, the court acknowledged that the Town of Brook-
field had a significant interest in protecting the privacy of its
residents in their homes.8 However, the court held that in a
public-forum setting, the first amendment rights of a group of
picketers to exercise their freedom of speech outweighed the
interests of the municipality in protecting the privacy of its
citizens. 81 Thus, an attempt to prohibit all such expressive ac-
tivity was unconstitutional.8 2 The court also noted that the
Town already had enacted laws that would adequately safe-
guard its interests. 83
B. The Coffey Dissent
Circuit Judge Coffey, in his dissent, claimed the court had
inaccurately characterized the case as an attempt by the Town
to deprive the picketers of their right to be heard.84 Judge
Coffey asserted that several forms of communication were in
fact available to the picketers, 85 and that the Town did not
foreclose their ability to communicate through those channels.
The dissent further stated that in addition to their right to
express themselves, the picketers had an obligation to respect
the rights of others, "especially those foreign to the contro-
76. Schultz, 807 F.2d at 1350.
77. See cases cited supra note 59.
78. Schultz, 807 F.2d at 1349 (citing Association of Community Orgs. for Reform
Now v. Frontenac, 714 F.2d 813, 818 (8th Cir. 1983)).
79. The court points out that "[p]icketing is not by its very nature an activity inher-
ently disruptive of the coherency of an American neighborhood." Id. at 1350.
80. The court stated that of the two justifications the Town claimed for enacting
the ordinance, the protection of privacy was a more important justification than traffic
regulation. It said that "[t]he stated interest of the Town in protecting the privacy of its
residents is clearly a significant governmental interest." Id.
81. Id. at 1354.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 1355.
84. Id. at 1355-56 (Coffey, J., dissenting).
85. The media to which Judge Coffey refers include direct mail, radio, television,
newspapers and telephone. Id. at 1356.
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versy... who also have a right to enjoy the privacy, peace and
tranquility of their own homes." 86 Judge Coffey justified the
ordinance as merely a balancing of these conflicting rights
for the good of all."'
The dissent also disputed the majority's contention that in
order to have a valid restriction, the government must prove
that its ordinance is the least restrictive means of protecting
the interest involved.88 Instead, Judge Coffey intimated that
the standard should be that the restriction merely avoids in-
fringing upon expressive activities in a way that unduly bur-
dens an individual's rights.8 9 Judge Coffey would have held
that the ordinance, although imperfect, was nonetheless
constitutional.
Finally, the dissent found that the Town's interest in pro-
tecting the flow of vehicular traffic was indeed a legitimate
concern 90 and that the picketing was incompatible with the
normal use of the streets involved. 91 Thus the Town's ordi-
nance was justified by compelling state interests in both pro-
tecting the privacy of residents and in regulating vehicular
and pedestrian traffic. 92
V. ANALYSIS
While the Schultz v. Frisby93 court's ultimate holding that
the ordinance was unconstitutional follows the modern trend
in first amendment law,94 the decision brings into focus several
problems relating to the tests of constitutionality applied to
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 1369. See also supra notes 77-78 and accompanying text.
89. Schultz, 807 F.2d at 1369. Judge Coffey states: "'Nor are such regulations inva-
lid simply because there is some imaginable alternative that might be less burdensome
on speech .... The validity of such regulations does not turn on a judge's agreement
with the responsible decision-maker concerning the most appropriate method for pro-
moting significant government interests." Id. at 1368 (quoting United States v. Alber-
tini, 472 U.S. 675, 689 (1985)).
90. Schultz, 807 F.2d at 1361.
91. Id. at 1366.
92. Id.
93. 807 F.2d 1339 (7th Cir. 1986).
94. The Court's reasoning in United States v. Grace. 461 U.S. 171 (1983), seems
applicable to the question of whether a residential street is a traditional public forum.
In Grace, the Court held that the sidewalks around the Supreme Court building were as
much traditional public forums as all other sidewalks in Washington, D.C., despite their
[Vol. 71:201
FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION
such restrictions. Specifically, the decision highlights the diffi-
culties in determining whether a restriction is (A) narrowly
tailored (B) serves a significant government interest, and
(C) leaves open ample alternative channels.95
A. How Narrowly Tailored Must a Restriction Be?
The Schultz majority adopted the standard that in order to
be constitutional, a regulation on speech must be the least re-
strictive means available for protecting the interest in-
volved.96 However, subsequent Supreme Court action on this
issue 97 and the assertions made in Judge Coffey's dissent draw
the correctness of this standard into question.
The first amendment requires that no law infringe upon
the public's freedom of speech. There is no qualification on
the level of governmental infringement allowed.98 Thus, the
question of how narrowly tailored a restriction must be - the
most narrow possible or merely narrow enough 99 - becomes
a question of the intent of the Framers of the Constitution. If
the Framers had intended to allow the government some lee-
way in its regulation of speech, they might have written "Con-
gress shall make no law ... [unduly] abridging the freedom of
speech .... ." The failure to include this phrasing indicates
the importance the Framers placed on individual liberty and a
free interchange of ideas.
As the Court stated in 1957: "The protection given speech
and press was fashioned to assure unfettered interchange of
ideas for the bringing about of political and social changes de-
location. This was because the courthouse sidewalks were indistinguishable from the
rest of the sidewalks in the city. Id. at 183.
That situation is analogous to a street in a residential neighborhood; since a street in
a residential neighborhood is indistinguishable from other streets in the city, it should
be treated in the same manner - as a traditional public forum. Indeed, the Schultz
court acknowledges that "[a] holding that streets located in residential areas are not
public forums would represent a radical departure from the general direction of first
amendment jurisprudence." Schultz, 807 F.2d at 1347.
95. The court appears to treat the issue of content-neutrality, the fourth prong of
the test laid out in Perry, as a given and does not address it in the majority decision.
96. See supra notes 76-78 and accompanying text.
97. See supra note 59.
98. Of course the first amendment's scope has been construed over the years to
depend upon the type of speech involved and the forum in which the expressive activity
takes place. See supra notes and accompanying text.
99. See supra note 59.
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sired by the people."' 00 Logically, in order to facilitate the
political and social evolution intended, the government cannot
be allowed to burden the activity that seeks to bring it about.
Failure to uphold this "least restrictive means" requirement
would blur the distinction between democracy and tyranny.
Thus, the court's adoption of the more strict requirement
that the ordinance be the least restrictive means available is
necessary, despite the disagreement within the Court,'0' in or-
der to uphold the original purpose of the first amendment. 102
B. How Significant an Interest is the Privacy
of an Individual?
By stating that the Town of Brookfield had a significant
interest in protecting the privacy of its citizens in their homes,
the Schultz court was in a position to balance a constitution-
ally guaranteed right against the desire to retain the sanctity
of the one place in which we all expect our personal privacy to
be respected. The court was correct in ruling that privacy is a
significant interest, and that interest is worthy of governmen-
tal protection in order to preserve the places of individual ref-
uge in our society.
But as the majority points out, the Town already had in
place ordinances that would protect the privacy of its citizens
in their homes. 10 3 Those ordinances would protect the resi-
dents of the Town from such problems as obstruction of
streets and sidewalks, loud and unnecessary noise, destruction
of property, criminal trespass, and disorderly conduct."
100. Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484 (1957).
101. See City of Watseka v. Illinois Pub. Action Council, 107 S. Ct. 919, 920
(1987) (Rehnquist, C.J., White, O'Connor, JJ., dissenting).
102. As a means of"narrowly tailoring" the ordinance in order to make it constitu-
tional, one might reasonably consider adding to the prohibition on picketing the term
"disruptive," so as to ban only activities that would interfere with the dedicated purpose
of the forum involved. This, however, would leave the definition of "disruptive" to the
parties enforcing the ordinance. Such a situation would in no way alleviate the "chil-
ling effect" of the restriction on expressive activities, since picketers would have little
idea whether they were likely to be arrested for stepping beyond the bounds of what
officials believed to be "disruptive."
103. Schultz, 807 F.2d at 1355.
104. Id. The court completely ignored the applicability of these ordinances in
claiming that a "householder cannot draw the blinds to shield herself from an unwel-
come visage or turn up the stereo to drown out an unpleasant voice" when confronted
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With this in mind, it appears that Dr. Victoria's problem
was not the picketing before his house but was the inadequate
enforcement of the valid ordinances already in place. This
does not justify a prohibition on picketing in the area: "To an
extent, disruption is the price of living in a free society."' 0 5
C. What Makes an Alternative Channel
of Communication "'Ample?"
The Schultz court found that the Town of Brookfield ordi-
nance left open only alternative channels which significantly
altered the quality and character of the picketers' message.
Thus, the court stated, they were not "ample" alternatives. 06
But a problem arises with the court's consideration of the
quality and character of the picketers' message. The court
fails to recognize that all forms of communication are unique
and carry with them their own special qualities and character-
istics. 10 7 If a mere change in the character of the message be-
ing sent is sufficient to classify an alternative channel as not
being ample, then no prohibition on a desired form of commu-
nication could ever be upheld as constitutional. 0 8
Alternatively, the dissent's free-handed approach to the
definition of ample alternatives is also inadequate. Judge Cof-
fey points out that such alternatives as newspapers, radio and
television are available.109 However, consideration of the cost
involved in using alternative channels is important in assess-
ing their adequacy. 110 The extra cost involved in using these
alternatives may be prohibitive for underfinanced groups,
with door-to-door solicitation. Id. at 1354. It is unlikely that these ordinances would
be any less protective against intrusion by solicitors than against intrusion by picketers.
105. Id. at 1353.
106. Id. at 1348.
107. The courts have recognized that printed media, such as leaflets and picket
signs, are most appropriate for complex messages. On the other hand, simple messages
are better communicated during a face-to-face conversation. See, e.g., National Anti-
Drug Coalition, Inc. v. Bolger, 737 F.2d 717, 726-27 (7th Cir. 1984).
108. In fact, the Court has upheld such a restriction. See Heffron v. International
Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 452 U.S. 640 (1981). In Heffron the form of
communication banned and the form which was allowed had different characters, thus
failing the test used by the Schultz court, yet the restriction was upheld because the
state's interest in the flow of traffic was great enough.
109. Schultz, 807 F.2d at 1356 (Coffey, J., dissenting).
110. See, e.g., Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141, 146 (1943) (Door to door
distribution of circulars is essential to the poorly financed causes of little people.).
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and alternatives which are not feasible can hardly be consid-
ered "ample."
A solution to the problem would be three - pronged, con-
sidering (1) the number of alternatives, (2) the character of the
message the alternatives would allow, and (3) the cost of those
alternatives. Under this approach, a change in the character
of the message being sent would not necessarily make the al-
ternatives inadequate; rather, their adequacy would depend on
the nature of the message in conjunction with the other two
factors, possibly allowing one factor to compensate for an-
other. 'II Had the Schultz court applied this standard, it might
have still found the alternatives to be inadequate, since each
one mentioned in Judge Coffey's dissent was probably too ex-
pensive for many groups.
VI. CONCLUSION AND IMPACT OF THE CASE
Schultz v. Frisby"' presented the Seventh Circuit Court of
Appeals with a case that forced it to address the issue of bal-
ancing the privacy rights of citizens in their homes against the
rights of others to engage in expressive activity. By applying
standard tests of first amendment law, the court reached an
equitable resolution of the problem, allowing the balance to
tip toward a constitutionally protected right. No new con-
stitutional trails were blazed; the court merely enforced al-
ready existing first amendment principles. But the majority
decision, in conjunction with the dissent and splits of opinion
among the federal courts, brought to light some of the
problems in this area for possible resolution in the future.
HUGH J. O'HALLORAN
111. This approach, however, must be applied carefully to avoid possible discrimi-
natory enforcement of restrictions, allowing application of more repressive regulations
against some groups simply because they are able to financially afford the alternatives.
Instead, the standard would have to be whether the underfinanced groups could afford
the alternatives, even if a well-financed group was challenging the ordinance.
112. 807 F.2d 1339 (7th Cir. 1986).
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